The parties request that the date of January 7, 2008 at 1:30 pm be set for status of

preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

28

Mr. Saez, and that the date of December 3, 2007, currently set, be vacated for the reasons set forth below.

The parties stipulate and request that the Court find the following as a factual basis for excluding the time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act:

- **(1)** Defense counsel Mary Conn is currently scheduled to appear in Santa Cruz County Superior Court for an unrelated jury trial and is unavailable on December 3, 2007.
- In addition, the government is in the process of preparing and providing **(2)** discovery in this case. An exclusion of time is necessary to afford the government time to complete the discovery process and to permit the defense to adequately assess the discovery and make informed decisions regarding any possible trial in this case.

For these reasons, the parties agree that a continuance is necessary to ensure that counsel is available and prepared to make informed decisions regarding the case, and denial of such a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant effective case preparation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(8)(A) and 3161(h)(B)(iv).

Respectfully submitted, Dated: November 30, 2007 MARY E. CONN & ASSOCIATES

> /s/ Mary Elizabeth Conn,

Attorney for Defendant Ricardo Saez

SCOTT N. SCHOOLS **United States Attorney**

/s/ Thomas M. O'Connell, AUSA By permission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER EXCLUDING TIME

PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

RICARDO SAEZ,

Defendant.

FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE IN THE STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE COURT INDEPENDENTLY FINDS, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time from December 3, 2007 to January 7, 2008 is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act requirements of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161 pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3161(h)(8)(A) and 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). The Court finds that the time is excludable in that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(8)(A) and (B)(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE